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Abstract
Output falls by unusually large amounts after recent ¯nancial crisis, much more
than what the behavior of capital and labor would suggest. In the language of stan-
dard development accounting, total factor productivity (TFP) falls markedly during
¯nancial crises, as we document with evidence from recent crises. These falls in TFP
are intriguing because they are unusual: the fall in TFP that occurs during the ¯rst
year following the crisis episodes exceeds two standard deviations in all cases. They
are also puzzling because given the magnitude of the fall in TFP, a standard neoclas-
sical model would predict that hours worked should fall much more than they do in
the data. Our goal in this paper is twofold: document the unusual behavior of TFP
during crises, and describe the challenge that this shock poses for standard neoclassical
models. We study in detail the case of Mexico after the 1994 ¯nancial crisis. The fact
that the behavior of factor series diverges so much from the predictions of standard
models suggests that factor hoarding plays a large role during ¯nancial crises. Using
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1standard models of factor hoarding we ¯nd that capital utilization and labor hoarding
account for large fraction of the variance of TFP both during and outside the crisis.
But TFP adjusted for changes in factor use continues to drop by an unusual amount
in 1995, and the predicted fall in output continues to exceed its data counterpart. The
fact that TFP falls less is o®set by the fall in factor use.
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Output falls by unusually large amounts during recent ¯nancial crises, much more than what
the behavior of capital and labor use would suggest. In the language of standard development
accounting, total factor productivity (TFP) falls very markedly during ¯nancial crisis, as we
document with evidence from recent crises. These falls in TFP are intriguing because they
are unusual: the deviation from TFP trend that occurs during the ¯rst year following the
crisis episodes we study exceeds two standard deviations in all cases. They are also puzzling
because given the magnitude of the fall in TFP, a standard neoclassical model would predict
that hours worked should fall much more than they do in the data. Our goal in this paper
is twofold: document the unusual behavior of TFP during crises, and describe the challenge
that this shock poses for standard neoclassical models.
We make these points in the open economy neoclassical model described by Mendoza,
1991. In particular, we treat ¯nancial crises as exogenous shocks to interest rates and TFP.
Most of the existing literature on ¯nancial crises focuses on what triggers the collapse in the
¯rst place. For instance, in a special issue of the Journal of International Economics devoted
to understanding the causes of Mexico's 1994 \Tequila" crisis, Flood et al. (1996) and Calvo
and Mendoza (1996) study the role played by °ow imbalances (liquid ¯nancial assets vs.
broad monetary aggregates for instance, or short-run debt vs. gross foreign reserves). In
the same issue, Cole and Kehoe (1996) and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996) conjecture
that Mexico's large stock of short-term debt may have given rise to self-ful¯lling speculative
attacks against peso-denominated bonds. These and many related articles have shed some
light on what causes ¯nancial collapses in nations like Mexico, but they do not try to account
for the sharp drop in output that invariably follows the collapse. More recent models (see e.g.
Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2001, Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1999, and Lahiri
and Vegh, 2002) provide qualitative explanations for the contractions of output. Cavallo,
Kisselev, Perri and Roubini (2004) show that large falls in output are possible, using a sticky-
price model with a margin constraint. However, they do not analyze a speci¯c episode and
compare model predictions to data. Overall, and like Calvo (2000), our assessment is that
there has been little emphasis on the behavior of output after ¯nancial crises. Our goal in
1this paper is to contribute to ¯lling this gap.
In order to study the real impact of ¯nancial crises, we concentrate our attention on Mex-
ico's 1995 crisis. While ¯nancial crises share many characteristics, a satisfactory quantitative
study of the real impact of these episodes must incorporate country speci¯c features. In the
case of Mexico, a number of deep ¯scal shocks accompanied the ¯nancial crisis. Pressed by
international organizations to improve its ¯scal situation, the Mexican government decided
to raise energy prices and the rate at which it taxes consumption ¯rst quarter of 1995. In
our quantitative experiments, we model those shocks explictly. As a result and among other
bene¯ts, our TFP calculations control for the fact that energy use fell a lot during 1995.
Our main ¯nding is that the standard open economy neoclassical model predicts that hours
worked, hence output, should have fallen much more than they did in Mexico in 1995. We
also ¯nd that this result is robust to a host of calibration and modeling considerations. In
particular, the result holds for various speci¯cation of preferences, and various assumptions
as to the extent to which agents saw the crisis coming.
The fact that the behavior of factor series diverges so much from the predictions of
standard models suggests that factor hoarding plays a large role during ¯nancial crises. One
should in fact expect large swings in capital utilization and e®ort during crises. For several
quarters, interest rates are well above trend while total factor productivity is well below
trend. This gives ¯rms strong incentives to postpone the consumption of capital services
(say by leaving plants or machines temporarily idle) and economize on variable expenditures
such as wear and tear until conditions improve. Similarly, employment swings may be limited
due to adjustment costs, and ¯rms may use the e®ort margin to adjust to the fall in the
marginal product of labor. In the case of Mexico, these swings could have been magni¯ed
by ¯scal shocks. For instance, the marginal returns to e®ort fell due to hikes in consumption
and labor income tax rates. Using standard models of factor hoarding (see Greenwood and
Hu®man, or Burnside and Eichenbaum, 1995), we ¯nd that capital utilization and labor
hoarding account for large fraction of the variance of TFP both during and outside the
crisis. In particular and not surprisingly, our calculations suggest that the 1995 crisis led
to big falls in capital utilization and e®ort. But TFP adjusted for changes in factor use
continues to drop by an unusual amount in 1995, and the predicted fall in output continues
2to exceed its data counterpart. The fact that TFP falls less is o®set by the fall in factor use.
These results show that the behavior of TFP during ¯nancial crises is not only unusual
in a statistical, time-series sense. It is also puzzling in that given the magnitude of the TFP
drop, standard variations on the neoclassical growth model all predict than output should
fall much more than it does in the data. This suggests to us that understanding the real
impact of ¯nancial crises will require some modeling of the allocation of resources on a more
disaggregated level.
Other recent papers are seminal in the study of output in the Mexican case. Burstein,
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2002) focus on the di®erence between the rate of depreciation of
the Peso and the rate of in°ation during 1995, in Mexico and South Korea. They also analyze
the behavior of output. They present a model with four sectors: local, export, tradable and
non-tradable goods. The exogenous shock in their model is the tightening of an external
borrowing constraint. They present results for two main variants of their model: with and
without credit market frictions. They model credit market frictions in a reduced-form way,
assuming the devaluation of the peso is associated with a fall in total factor productivity in
the export sector. The version with credit market frictions produces yearly falls in output
slightly bigger than the one observed in Mexico: -7.36% versus -6.37%.1 This model is
successful in predicting falls in output of similar magnitude as observed. However, there
is an important shortcoming: the required fall in TFP in the export sector is very large:
-50.3% in one year. They report no evidence of such a fall in productivity. 2 Mendoza
(2002) shows that there can be large falls in output in a °exible-price model with a liquidity
constraint. His objective is to show that sudden stops of capital °ows can be the outcome of
the dynamics of a real business cycle model. He calibrates his model using Mexican data and
carries out simulations in which the economy goes from a best to a worst state in terms of
high interest rates, low productivity and high consumption taxes. He shows that large falls
in output are possible. However, he does not simulate the Mexican crisis and compare model
1The authors report the annual fall in GDP between 1994 and 1995 in aggregate, not per capita terms.
2Additionally, the model predicts a fall in tradable output much bigger than observed: -8.98% versus
-4.38%. The version of their model without credit market frictions is also partially successful at accounting
for the behavior of output. Total output falls by 2.65% in the model versus 6.37% in the data. However, the
model predicts a very large increase in tradable output, whereas it fell by a signi¯cant amount in the data:
24.06% versus -4.38%.
3predictions to data. Regarding productivity, he sets the standard deviation of productivity
shocks to mimic the standard deviation of tradable-goods GDP in Mexico. Finally, the work
of Bergoeing et al. (2002) has some similarities with this paper. They analyze di®erent
explanations for the di®erent growth paths followed by Chile and Mexico since 1980. They
¯nd that productivity can largely account for the behavior of Mexican output.
The two papers most related to ours are Cook and Devereux (2004) and Gerter, Gilchrist
and Natalucci (2003). Cook and Devereux use a dynamic general equilibrium model of a
small open economy to simulate the Asian crises in Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand.
They show that in their model an increase in a country's exogenous risk premium as large as
in the data can lead to output falls as big as observed ones. However, they do not consider the
°uctuations of TFP in their simulations. In this paper we show that there is evidence that
TFP fell by infrequently large amounts in the year after the Asian ¯nancial crisis. The paper
by Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003) presents a dynamic general equilibrium model that
incorporates a ¯nancial mechanism that magni¯es the quantitative e®ect of an increase in
the exogenous risk premium. They show that their simulation of the ¯nancial crisis in South
Korea produces falls in output as large as observed. They assume TFP is constant based
on the following reasoning. They report that labor productivity (not TFP) fell by a large
amount in Korea after the ¯nancial crisis of 1997. Their model includes variable capital
utilization, modeled exactly as in our paper. They show that the risk premium shock leads
to a fall in utilization. Then they add that this fall in utilization can account for the behavior
of measured labor productivity, i.e. output per worker measured ignoring utilization. This
result is in contrast with ours. We ¯nd that variable capital utilization can account for
less than one third of the fall in measured TFP. Additionally, introducing TFP measured
considering variable capital utilization into the model as an exogenous shock leads to falls
in output that are much bigger than those observed.
2 Evidence
In this section we document the fact that ¯nancial crises are followed by unusually large
drops in TFP and GDP using evidence from Mexico's 1994 crisis, and from the 1997 crisis
4in South Korea and Thailand. We also present some evidence that these falls are persistent.
Both GDP per capita and TFP remain below trend for several years after the crisis.







where Yt denotes GDP at date t, Kt is aggregate capital, Lt denotes aggregate hours worked
and ® 2 (0;1) measures the importance of capital in production. We assume like Chari et al.
(2004) that At, aggregate TFP at date t, equals zt(1 + °)t, where zt is stationary and ° ¸ 0
is an exogenous trend. Let yt; kt and lt denote the per capita counterparts of Yt, Kt and
Lt, respectively. In the neoclassical growth model, per capita output and capital grow at
constant rate ° along the balanced growth path, while per capita hours worked are constant.
Letting b yt and b kt be detrended per capita output and capital, we have





In order to measure zt, we need empirical counterparts for b yt;b kt and lt: We constructed
capital stock series a perpetual inventory approach with geometric depreciation and yearly
data from the International Financial Statistics database (IMF 2004). We assume that
capital depreciates at a yearly depreciation rate of 8%.3 Capital formation series begin in
1963 for Mexico and Thailand, and 1966 for South Korea. GDP series start in 1950 for
Mexico and Thailand, and in 1953 for South Korea. For Mexico, we measure total hours
as in Bergoeing et al. (2002) as the product of total employment and average hours per
worker in the manufacturing sector as estimated with Manufacturing Survey data [explain
a bit]. Calculations are similar for South Korea and Thailand except that an estimate of
average hours worked is available for most sectors in those two countries.4 Labor series can
3We follow the procedure in Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe and Soto (2002) to obtain time series on real gross
¯xed and gross capital formation.
4For South Korea we use data on total employment and average hours worked per week, as reported
by the South Korean National Statistical O±ce. Total employment corresponds to employed individuals in
all sectors, of age 15 and higher. Average hours worked correspond to all industries, excluding agricultural
activities. Data were downloaded from http://www.nso.go.kr. For Thailand total employment corresponds
to employed individuals in all sectors, of age 13 and higher, as reported by the International Labour O±ce
(ILO) and the Thai National Statistical O±ce. Average hours worked correspond to all industries, exclud-
5be constructed for the 1980-2000, 1970-2002 and 1989-1999 time periods in Mexico, South
Korea and Thailand, respectively.
We calculate yt, kt, and lt by dividing Yt, Kt and Lt by the number of adults between ages
15 and 64.5 Population series for the three countries start in 1960. To calculate detrended
variables b yt and b kt we divide yt and kt by the average geometric growth factor of yt in the
period before the crisis episode. For Mexico the growth rate between 1960 and 1994 is 1.7%.
For South Korea the growth rate between 1960 and 1997 is 5.3%. For Thailand the growth
rate between 1960 and 1997 is 4.4%. Finally, we need to a value for capital share ®: Gollin
(2002) ¯nds that after distributing the income of the self-employed to capital and labor
income, labor income shares do not vary much across countries and time, and take values
around 70%. Correspondingly, we set ® = 0:3.6 Given the resulting samples for b yt, b kt, and
lt we can measure TFP zt for the periods 1980-2002, 1970-2002 and 1989-1999 for Mexico,
South Korea and Thailand, respectively.
Figure ?? shows the resulting series for Mexico, Thailand and Korea with vertical lines
marking the onset of the ¯nancial crisis. Output falls by over 10% in all countries in the year
following the crisis, over 15% in Thailand. Capital on the other hand falls little during the
crisis in all countries, and hours fall much less than output in all cases. In fact, in Mexico
and Thailand, hours worked fall by less than 2%. In Korea hours worked fall by a larger 7%
in 1998, but this only half the fall in output. Since capital and labor fall little during crises,
TFP has to fall a lot to account for the fall in output. If fell by 15% in Thailand in 1998,
7% in Korea and 8.6% in Mexico in 1994. The magnitude of these falls is very unusual for
all countries. Falls in GDP and TFP exceed two standard deviations in all cases. They are
also the largest falls in all our samples, with the exception of the GDP fall in Korea in 1998.
Finally, notice that the falls output and TFP triggered by crises are persistent. They remain
below trend in all cases for several years. For Mexico, these two variables had not recovered
to their pre-crisis level by 2000, the year in which our sample of zt ends.
ing agricultural activities and public administration, as reported by the ILO. Data were downloaded from
http://www.nso.go.th and http://laborsta.ilo.org.
5We use population data for Mexico as reported by Bergoeing et al. (2002). For South Korea, data
were downloaded from http://www.nso.go.kr. For Thailand, data were obtained from the World Bank
Development Indicators CD (World Bank 2004).
6Young (1995) arrive a value of 1 ¡ ® = 0:703 for Korea with data from the 1966-1990 time period.
6[Figure 1: Levels of b yt and zt]
Naturally, these results could be sensitive to some of the measurement assumptions we
have made. Young (1995) argues for instance that data on changes in inventories are of
very poor quality in East Asia. We constructed alternative capital stock measures for each
country excluding changes in inventories with negligible consequences on our results.7 We
also experimented with detrending factor 1+° = 1:02 which is the value Kehoe and Prescott
(2002) propose.8 Results are unchanged with one exception. In the case of South Korea,
the e®ect of the 1997 becomes less persistent as b yt and zt surpass their 1997 levels by the
2000. Next, we redid all our calculations using national sources of data for b yt and b kt:9
Using national sources leads to much shorter time series because countries modify their
systems of national accounts every now and again. This makes results more sensitive to the
choice of initial capital. On the other hand, IMF data include only the most basic national
accounts variables. National accounts allow us to construct better empirical counterparts for
theoretical variables, which is part of the calibration procedure we undertake in the sequel,
as in Cooley and Prescott (1995). To construct the empirical counterpart of b yt, we subtract
indirect business taxes and impute the return to government capital and the return plus
depreciation of the stock of durable goods. To construct b kt we take into account private
and public investment as well as purchases of durable goods, all accumulated with di®erent
depreciation rates. The behavior of detrended series changes little. It is still the case that
the falls in b yt and zt after ¯nancial crises are unusually large.
7Our TFP ¯ndings for South Korea can be compared to the results in Young (1995). His goal is to isolate
the main sources of growth in the period 1966-1990 for four East Asian countries, including South Korea.
He reports that the average logarithmic annual growth rate of z
1¡®
t in South Korea was 1.7% between 1966
and 1990. The main di®erence between his calculations and ours is that he takes into account changes in
the quality labor and capital. After excluding inventory changes as he does, we calculate that the average
logarithmic annual growth rate of z
1¡®
t for South Korea for the period 1970-1990 is 2.6%. The di®erence
is large and is due to Young's adjustment for quality. Assuming a labor income share of 70% and using
Young's data on raw inputs, we ¯nd that z
1¡®
t in South Korea grew at an average rate of 2.7% between
1970 and 1990. In other words, our measurement of TFP leads to the same growth rate as the one found
in Young (1995) if no adjustment for input quality is made. It would be interesting to measure how much
quality-adjusted labor changes after ¯nancial crisis episodes. It can be the case, for example, that less skilled
workers are laid o® in a higher proportion after a ¯nancial crisis. It can also be the case that labor market
regulations prevent ¯rms from discriminating among workers.
8This is the U.S. trend. They interpret productivity as the stock of knowledge useful in production and
argue that knowledge is not country-speci¯c.
9Mexican data was downloaded from http://dgcnesyp.inegi.gob.mx. South Korean data was downloaded
from http://www.nso.go.kr. Thai data was downloaded from http://www.nso.go.th.
7In summary, we show that recent ¯nancial crises triggered unusually large falls in de-
trended GDP per capita and TFP in Mexico and East Asia. There is also some evidence
that these falls are persistent. These ¯ndings beg several interesting questions. In the re-
mainder of the paper, we study whether small open economy neoclassical models can account
for the behavior of GDP in the Mexican case.
3 The open economy neoclassical model
In this section we evaluate the consistency of the open economy neoclassical model (as
formulated for instance by Mendoza, 1991) with the behavior of output during ¯nancial
crises. We model crises as exogenous shocks to TFP and interest rates. We describe a
procedure to measure the magnitude of those shocks in the case of Mexico's 1995 crisis.
Feeding the resulting shocks in the model yields paths for endogenous variables that we
compare to data. We ¯nd that given the size of the TFP shock, the neoclassical model
predicts that output should have fallen much more than it did in 1995 in Mexico. We also
¯nd that this result is robust to even large changes in parameters, in the speci¯cation of
preferences, and in the speci¯cation of aggregate technological opportunities.
Because Mexico underwent deep ¯scal changes in 1995 as part of the government's re-
sponse to the crisis, we study a benchmark model where agents face distortionary taxes on
consumption, capital income, and labor income. Also for ¯scal reasons, Mexico's government
signi¯cantly raised energy prices in Mexico. To control for the impact of this shock, we model
the role of energy in production. Incorporating these elements will enable us to measure the
quantitative impact of ¯scal shocks on the behavior of output in Mexico in 1995.
While introducing distortionary taxes complicates computations a great deal by prevent-
ing us from solving the standard planner's problem, we believe that the exercise we have in
mind cannot be carried out meaningfully without that feature. Massive ¯scal shocks hit the
Mexican economy in 1995. That models that do not model these shocks fail to explain the
behavior of real activity in Mexico during that year would not appear very surprising.
83.1 Benchmark model
Consider an economy in which time is discrete and in¯nite. The economy contains a con-
tinuum of mass one of identical households, and a continuum of mass one of identical ¯rms.
Households live forever. They order consumption and labor supply sequences fct;ltg
1
t=0














where ¯ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor, º > 1 determines the wage elasticity of labor supply
and ½ > 0 measures the disutility from working. With these preferences, labor supply
depends only on the current wage, wt; and is independent of consumption or income. These
preferences are commonly used in small open economy models (see e.g. Mendoza (1991) and
(2002), Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1995) and Neumeyer and Perri (2001)). Correia, Neves
and Rebelo (1995) argue that they improve the ability of small open economy models to
replicate business cycle properties.
Households have access to a perfect international capital market where one-period risk-
free claims to a unit of the consumption good can be traded at an exogenous rate rt at the
beginning of period t: We denote by at the risk-free asset holdings of households in period t.
Households can also invest in physical capital, which they sell to ¯rms at price 1+rk
t: Let kt






where Ã > 0. As is well-known, adjustment costs are necessary in open economy models to
prevent investment from being counterfactually volatile. Assuming that adjustment costs are
borne by households rather than ¯rms is immaterial. An equivalent decentralization would
have ¯rms make investment decisions and bear adjustment costs. The speci¯cation we use
shortens the exposition by keeping the ¯rm's problem static. Households also face three
types of taxes. In period t, consumption is taxed at rate ¿c
t ; labor income is taxed at rate
¿l
t; and returns on physical capital and international assets are taxed at rate ¿k
t . Therefore,
9households face the following budget constraint at date t:
ct (1 + ¿
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At date t, ¯rms transform physical capital k
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t of the consumption good, where zt is TFP and ®e + ®k + ®n = 1. We
assume that energy is available perfectly elastically at price pe
t in date t and that fraction
± > 0 of the physical capital ¯rms purchase from households depreciates within each period.
Therefore, at date t, ¯rms choose (nt;k
f





















¡ ntwt ¡ etp
e
t:
The government, for its part, collects tax revenues ¿c








t. We assume for simplicity that these revenues are dissipated. This is without loss of
generality in this model because labor supply is independent of consumption and income
given our formulation of preferences.
We now de¯ne an equilibrium under the simplifying assumption that agents perfectly
foresee the path of TFP, taxes and all prices. In the quantitative section, we consider other
assumptions on expectations. Given an initial stock of capital and initial international as-





t=0 ; consumption, labor supply and savings sequences fct;lt;kt+1;at+1g
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t=0 ; and se-







such that, given prices:
1. fct;lt;kt+1;at+1g
1








solves the ¯rm's problem for all t;
3. The market for physical capital clears: kt = k
f
t in all t;
4. The labor market clears: nt = lt in all t;
We will now ask whether this benchmark model can account for the behavior of output,
labor, capital and energy after Mexico's Tequila Crisis.
103.2 Data and calibration
In order to compute the predictions of this benchmark model for output and hours in Mexico
in 1995, we ¯rst need a path for TFP in Mexico that is consistent with the theory. This
requires a few adjustments to the procedure we used in the previous section. Date t TFP in











Therefore, we need empirical counterparts for the theoretical variables yt;kt;nt; and et.
Appendix A describes the procedure we use in some detail. Our basic approach closely follows
Atkeson and Kehoe (1999). We use quarterly data to construct the empirical counterparts
of theoretical variables. There are four key conceptual di®erences between GDP as reported
in the Mexican national accounts (measured GDP) and output yt in the model. First, yt
equals the sum of payments to labor, capital and energy, i.e. yt = wtrt + rk
tkt + pe
tet.
GDP, on the other hand, treats energy as an intermediate output and thus corresponds
to yt ¡ pe
tet = wtrt + rk
tkt. Second, there is no energy-producing sector in the model,
whereas measured GDP includes the value added by the energy sector. Third, measured
GDP includes indirect business taxes (IBT), whereas output yt does not. The fourth and
¯nal di®erence is that output in the model includes the return to all capital in the economy,
whereas measured GDP does not. It excludes the return on government capital and the
return plus depreciation of the stock of durable goods. We make the four corresponding
adjustments to measured GDP to construct a measure of output consistent with yt. We
call this adjusted GDP measured gross output. We also construct capital, labor and energy
series that are consistent with the model. In particular, we take into account the fact that in
the model there is no energy-producing sector, and that in the model only ¯rms use energy.
Besides empirical counterparts for yt;kt;nt;et, we need three technological parameters
before measuring TFP. We assume the share of labor income in GDP is 0.7. This assumption
is supported by the work of Gollin (2002), who ¯nds that, after adjusting labor income taking
into account the income of the self-employed, labor income shares take values around 70%,
across a large set of countries, and across time. We assume that the share of labor income
11in the energy-producing sector in Mexico is also 70%.10 Given these assumptions, the shares













We now turn to measuring the empirical counterparts of exogenous shocks in the model,
other than TFP: international interest rates, the price of energy and taxes. We calculate
interest rate rt in period t as
rt =
(1 + Tbill ratet)(1 + MX Brady spreadt)
1 + US inflationt
¡ 1;
where Tbill ratet is the interest rate on US Treasury bills, MX Brady spreadt is the spread
between the return paid by Mexican Brady bonds and the interest rate paid by US Treasury
bills, and US inflationt is the relative change in the US GDP de°ator. In other words,
our proxy for rt is the real return paid by Mexican Brady bonds.11 Our sample of Mexican
Brady bond data starts in the last quarter of 1990 and ends in the ¯rst quarter of 2003.
We calculate the price of energy as a weighted average of the nominal price of natural gas,
gasoline and electricity divided by Mexico's GDP de°ator.12 In our quantitative experiments,
we scale the relative price of energy to match the average energy use level prior to 1995. We
calculate taxes on consumption, labor income and returns from capital and international
assets using the method of Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994).13 The calculated taxes are
10Verifying that this assumption is appropriate is di±cult in the case of Mexico since Mexican national
accounts do not provide compensation of employees of the oil and electricity companies run by the govern-
ment.
11Neumeyer and Perri (2001) use a similar construct to study the relationship between business cycles and
international interest rates in developing countries. The rates we use are end of quarter rates, using average
rates does not alter our quantitative ¯ndings.
12We follow the method used by Atkeson and Kehoe (1999). We are constrained to use yearly data on
prices and sales of energy to calculate the average price of energy. We assume that the nominal prices of
di®erent kinds of energy remain constant throughout each year. The Mexican government typically adjusts
energy prices either at the end or at the beginning of each year.
13Only data on total income tax revenues is available in Mexico. We follow the estimate reported in
Fernandez and Trigueros (2001) to split total income tax revenue into its components: individual and
12average e®ective tax rates, i.e the ratio of tax revenue to tax base. In the next ¯gure we plot
the empirical counterparts of the exogenous shocks.
[Figure 2: Plotting shocks (this is a plot with a lot of information)]
Figure ?? reveals that most of these series underwent unusually large changes in 1995.
In particular, and not surprisingly given the fact that capital and labor fall much less than
output during 1995, TFP falls markedly during the crisis. Measured gross output fell 10.1%
between the last quarter of 1994 and the last quarter of 1995, while capital fell by 0.7%, labor
fell by 2.5%, and energy fell by 24.4%. Given these data and our calculated technological
shares, TFP must fall by 7.1% to account for the fall of measured gross output in 1995.
Interest rates measured in annual terms rise from 8.7% on average during 1994 to 19.5% in
the ¯rst quarter of 1995. The price of energy jumps by 43% between the last quarter of 1994
and the ¯rst quarter of 1995, while the tax on consumption rises from 10.4% to 13.3% from
the last quarter of 1994 to the ¯rst quarter of 1995. On the other hand, the tax rate on labor
shows almost no change, falling from 12.5% to 12.2% between 1994 and 1995. The tax rate
on capital and asset returns falls from 9.5% to 7.4%.
Overall, the Mexican economy underwent a number of severe negative shocks in 1995.
We will now argue that given the magnitude of these shocks, the neoclassical growth model
predicts that GDP should have fallen much more than they did in 1995 in Mexico. We will
also argue that the quantitative impact of changes in ¯scal policy is small compared to the
role of TFP. To make these points, we ¯rst need to calibrate preference and adjustment
cost parameters. One way to calibrate the model would be to assume that at a given date
Mexico was on a balanced growth path. However, we do not think that such an assumption
is appropriate. Mexico underwent a series of deep crises in the 1980s after decades of brisk
growth. Between 1980 and 2003, GDP per capita did not grow in Mexico, and we do not
believe this to be a balanced growth path. Our calibration strategy consists of choosing
parameter values to match the statistical properties of input use and measured gross output
before 1995.14
corporate. We use these components to measure the tax rate on labor income, and on capital and asset
returns. Also, when measuring consumption taxes using OECD data, Mendoza et al. (1994) exclude the
\other taxes" item. Because this last item is large in magnitude in Mexico, we choose to include it.
14Bergoeing et al. (2002) follow a di®erent calibration procedure. Their main objective is to allow for a
comparison between Mexico and Chile over the past two decades. For some parameters, they impose values;
13Preference parameters ½ and º determine the level and volatility of labor supply, respec-
tively. We set ½ to match the average of our measure of hours worked per working age
adult before 1995. As for º, we begin by setting º = 1:5; which implies a wage elasticity
of labor supply of 2, the value used in Mendoza (1991). It falls within the range mentioned
by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu®man (1988), who cite studies of labor supply in the U.S.
Unfortunately, we were unable to ¯nd similar studies for Mexico. In this benchmark model
the predicted path for input and output series is independent of ¯. We simply set it as in





= 1, where r and ¿k are the
long run values of the international interest rate and the tax on the return on international
assets. In our model, the accumulation of international assets is a®ected by ¿k
t , which we
have to take into account when calibrating ¯: This assumption on ¯ implies that the steady
state growth rate of consumption is zero. To obtain a long run value for the interest rate,
we assume that the value it takes in the ¯rst quarter of 2003 (0.9% at a quarterly rate), the
last date in our sample, will be Mexico's cost of international funds in the future. We also
use the last value for ¿k
t in our sample (9.1%) as the long run value of the tax on capital
income. Regarding the capital adjustment cost parameter Ã, we choose its value to match
the observed standard deviation of the investment-to-measured gross output ratio before
1995.
Having set all parameters, we can now calculate the path our model predicts for input
use and output under various assumptions on agents' expectations. In all our experiments,
the initial period corresponds to the last quarter of 1990. In the ¯rst experiment (Perfect
foresight, PF) we assume that in the ¯rst period agents know the entire sequence of exogenous
shocks shown in ¯gure ??. In our second experiment (Perfect surprise, PS) we assume instead
that agents know all shocks up to the last quarter of 1994, but then expect shocks to assume
their average pre-crisis values inde¯nitely. That is, agents do not expect a crisis to occur in
1995. When they observe the values of shocks in the ¯rst quarter of 1995, agents immediately
revise their expectations to the path actually observed. We view this as approximating a
situation where households assign a positive but very small probability to the possibility of a
crisis in 1995. These assumptions on expectations enable us to use nonlinear methods based
For other parameters, they calculate average values using ¯rst order condition evaluated at di®erent dates.
14on Euler equations. Speci¯cally, the evolution of capital in this model boils down to the
following second-order di®erence equation for all t:












+ Ã (kt+2 ¡ kt+1)
1 + Ã (kt+1 ¡ kt)
: (3.1)
Given the initial level of capital, we use a shooting algorithm to ¯nd the path of capital such
that endogenous variables converge to steady state levels assuming that exogenous variables
stay at their 2003Q1 levels for ever. Appendix B provides the details. The equilibrium path
for capital and other endogenous variables can then be calculated using exact methods (up
to the precision of the computer for simple arithmetic operations.) Given the magnitude
of shocks in 1995, linear approximations around the steady state could yield inaccurate
results.15
3.3 Results
Figure 3 plots the predictions of the model for GDP, labor, the capital-output ratio, and
energy, for both the PF and PS experiments, and compare them to data. Simulated GDP
corresponds to yt ¡pe
tet. Data on GDP corresponds to measured gross output minus energy
expenditure. Each time series is scaled by its respective value in the last quarter of 1994.
This makes it easier to compare the contraction of economic activity in the model and in
the data.
Our key result is GDP, labor, the capital-output ratio and energy fall more than twice
as much in percentage terms as in the data. For instance, under both expectation scenarios,
GDP falls by about 10% in the data compared to almost 21% in the model. This is true,
that is, whether or not agents saw the crisis coming. The main di®erence between the two
experiments is the predicted path for the capital-output ratio. In the PF experiment, the
ratio falls more rapidly before 1995 as agents anticipate the crisis. This makes all variables
fall in anticipation of the large changes in exogenous variables in 1995. The ratio predicted
15Dotsey and Mao (1992) ¯nd that the accuracy of linear approximation methods worsens as the variance
of shocks rises. Also complicating the analysis is the fact that allocations in our model do not solve a modi¯ed
social planner's problem due to the presence of distortionary taxes.
15by the PS experiment tracks observed capital more closely.
To measure the relative role of each of the many shocks that hit the Mexican economy in
1995, we carried out PF experiments in which only one of the exogenous variables changes
after the last quarter of 1994, while other variables remain constant at their values in the
last quarter of 1994. We ¯nd that changes in the capital tax and the labor tax had little
e®ect on the behavior of GDP in 1995. Shocks to the consumption tax, interest rates and the
price of energy yielded more pronounced falls in output: -2.9%, -2.2% and -1.4% during 1995
respectively.16 The impact of TFP outweighs that of all other shocks combined. Holding
other exogenous variables at their end-of-1994 values, TFP alone would have caused GDP
to fall by 15.4% in 1995 relative to 1994. It is in other words the magnitude of the TFP
shocks that accounts for the model's counterfactually large fall in output. In particular,
the benchmark model's di±culties in matching the behavior of output and input use during
Mexico's 1995 crisis does not stem from ¯scal shocks.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to evaluating the robustness of these ¯ndings to




Even under our perfect surprise scenario, the model does not predict the rise in the capital-
output ratio prior to the crisis one observes in the data. It may be the case, therefore, that
agents' expectations were more optimistic than assumed in our PS calibration. To verify
this, we ran a perfect surprise experiment assuming that agents expected a constant level of
(low) interest rates after 1994 that yields a path for capital before the crisis that is consistent
with the data.17 Figure ?? shows that in that fashion one can generate a path for the capital
output ratio capital that approximates rather well the true path before the crisis.
16We take into account that keeping the interest rate ¯xed at its (high) value in the last quarter of 1994
induces a trend in endogenous variables. Results are reported net of this trend.
17Alternatively, modifying expected TFP values leads to similar results.
16[Figure 4: results from optimistic expectations, benchmark model]
Under these assumptions on agents' expectations, the fall in output during 1995 is ap-
proximately of the same magnitude as in the two previous experiments. Investment falls
more, because more capital had been accumulated anticipating low levels of the interest
rate. In sum, specifying expectations so as to match the behavior of the capital before the
crisis does not improve the model's performance following the crisis.
4.2 Elasticity of labor supply
Our ¯ndings could be sensitive to the assumed elasticity of labor supply. In particular, a
higher º would render labor supply less elastic, which should reduce the predicted fall in
hours worked, hence in output in 1995. In fact, it should be clear that one can ¯nd a value
for º such that the model will predict the correct fall in hours worked during the crisis. Figure
?? shows that setting º = 4:33, which is at the upper bound of the estimates available for
the United States, produces a fall in hours in 1995 that resembles the fall in the data.18
[Figure 5: low elasticity results with benchmark model]
But such a value for º predicts a counterfactually stable path for the labor input outside
the crisis. Its standard deviations in the samples 1990.4-1994.4 and 1990.4-2003.1 are much
smaller than the ones observed, as can be seen in the ¯gure. In short, it is not possible to
¯nd a value for º so that the model yields a reasonable path for hours work both during and
outside of the crisis period.
4.3 Standard preferences
Heretofore we have assumed preferences such that the wage elasticity of the labor supply is
exogenous and invariant over time. Correia et al. (1995) ¯nd that these preferences improve
the model's consistency with business cycle facts. It is interesting nonetheless to consider the
impact of giving households preferences that are more standard in closed economy exercises.
Speci¯cally, assume that households now order consumption and labor supply sequences
18Greenwood et al. (1988) report a range of values for the elasticity of labor supply. The maximum value
of º implicit in their work is 4.33.
17fct;ltg
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t flogct + ½log(1 ¡ nt)g;
where ½ > 0 measures the disutility associated with working. Household face the same



















Both conditions have the usual interpretation. The ¯rst says that the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between consumption in two consecutive periods must equal the return on savings
(the marginal rate of transformation between date t and date t + 1 consumption). The
second equates the marginal utility of leisure in each period to its opportunity cost, the
net wage times the marginal utility of consumption. Using ¯rst order conditions for pro¯t










Condition (4.3) shows how standard preferences could help account for the behavior of hours
worked in 1995. Hours worked are now a simple function of the consumption-output ratio.
If the model predicts a fall in consumption comparable in size to the fall in output in 1995,
the model will also predict little change in hours, as in the data.
Computing the model requires solving for a path of consumption, hours worked and
capital that satis¯es (4.1), (4.3) and the same di®erence equation in capital as before. In
implementing the algorithm described in appendix B, we set ½ to match the average level of
hours worked before the crisis. We also choose the initial level of asset a0 so that the model
implies an approximate debt to GDP ratio of 35% for Mexico in 1994, as in the data.19
As before, we can compute a path for endogenous variables under two expectation sce-
19This is approximately the value reported in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001).
18narios. The model with standard performs very poorly under perfect foresight. Indeed,
consumption then rises at the rate of interest net of the rate of time preference. Since inter-
est rates are high in 1995, consumption rises throughout the year while TFP falls markedly.
Correspondingly, the consumption- output ratio rises markedly and hours worked fall even
more drastically than in the previous model. Those results are available upon request. Un-
der perfect surprise assumptions however, agents adjust consumption in the ¯rst quarter of
1995 after discovering the true path of exogenous series. In particular, consumption must
be adjusted downward which could mitigate the impact on hours worked. Figure ?? shows
the results. Since the path of energy is little changed relative to previous experiment, we
replace that panel of the ¯gure with the consumption-income ratio, as this is the crucial
statistic in this model. The consumption adjustment in the ¯rst quarter of 1995 is such
that the consumption-output ratio actually falls, so that hours rise in the ¯rst quarter. But
this e®ect is short-lived, as consumption then starts rising steeply due to high interest rates.
Hours adjust downward after one quarter, as does output. In other words, once agents have
adjusted to the crisis, hours and GDP fall as much as in the benchmark model. Overall, the
predicted fall in those series continues to signi¯cantly exceed their empirical counterparts.
4.4 Factor hoarding
Financial crises create optimal conditions for big swings in factor utilization. Since TFP is
very low for a few quarters, direct returns to capital utilization are low. On the other hand,
the opportunity cost of capital is high during crises since interest rates are high, so that the
variable costs associated with high utilization (due, say, to wear and tear) are high. These
gives agents strong incentives to postpone the consumption of capital services until business
conditions improve. Likewise, labor services could be hoarded as e®ort falls. Employment
adjustment may be limited due to adjustment costs, and agents may use the unobservable
e®ort margin to adjust to the marked fall in labor productivity. In the case of Mexico, the fall
in e®ort could be compounded by the fact that labor income and consumption became more
heavily taxed in 1995. Our goal in the next few paragraphs is to quantify the importance of
these e®ects in standard models of factor hoarding.
194.4.1 Endogenous capital utilization
We model capital utilization as in Greenwood et al. (1988). Household preferences are the
same as in the benchmark model. However, we now assume that ¯rms can alter the rate
at which they utilize capital. Raising utilization in a given period raises output, but it

































where ut ¸ 0 is the rate of utilization in period t, and Á > 1 measures the e®ect of utilization
on depreciation. Firms continue to take all prices as given and choose k
f
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as in Greenwood et al. (1988). In the context of this model, therefore, the capital-output
ratio path implies a unique utilization path. TFP net of changes in capital utilization can












While no further adjustment to national accounts data is needed to implement those calcula-
tions, the capital stock needs to be recalculated, because its evolution depends on utilization
in each period. The capital stock and the utilization rate need to be calculated recursively.
Using an initial capital stock and a value for parameter Á we calculate utilization as de¯ned















where it is gross capital formation.20 Proceeding recursively yields a complete path for
capital, utilization and, therefore, TFP adjusted for utilization. Implementing this procedure
requires a value for Á, the curvature of the depreciation schedule. Simple algebra shows that
in this model the steady state depreciation rate is equal to r
Á¡1. We choose Á to imply a
steady state yearly depreciation rate of 8% (the constant depreciation rate we assumed in
the benchmark model), assuming that interest rates eventually become constant at their last
value in our sample.
Figure ?? shows the behavior of capital utilization between 1991 and 2003, and the
resulting adjusted TFP path. Because our measure of the capital-output ratio falls in 1995,
utilization does as well. This makes intuitive sense. TFP in the ¯rst quarter of 1995 falls by
a large amount while interest rates (the opportunity cost of capital) increase signi¯cantly.
This gives ¯rms an incentive to postpone the consumption of capital services. Speci¯cally,
we ¯nd that utilization fell 5.7% between the last quarter of 1994 and the last quarter of
1995. This implies that adjusted TFP falls less than unadjusted TFP (5.1% versus 7.1%).
Note however that it continues to fall by a large amount. In fact, relative to movements
outside of the crisis period, the 1995 change in adjusted TFP is as much of an outlier as the
change in unadjusted TFP.
The key question is whether making capital utilization endogenous improves the ability
of the model to account for the behavior of output and input use during the crisis. To
answer that question, we ¯rst recalibrated parameters to continue matching our calibration
targets. Figure ?? plots the predictions of the model for GDP, labor, capital and energy, in
the perfect foresight and perfect surprise experiments.
[Figure 8: results from model with variable capital utilization]
The results are quantitatively similar to those we obtained in the benchmark model.
GDP, labor, and capital fall much more than in the data. In fact, the model with utilization
20Data on gross capital formation has been adjusted so that it corresponds to the empirical counterpart
of theoretical gross investment in this model.
21predicts falls in all variables that are of magnitude similar to the ones we found in the
benchmark model. This is the case even though adjusted TFP falls less than unadjusted
TFP. The reason for this is simple: utilization is a new margin of adjustment when shocks hit
the economy. When faced with an exogenous shock in this model, ¯rms can adjust labor and
energy use as before, but they can also change utilization rates. This is reminiscent of the
results in Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996). They show that the response of the economy
to a given productivity shock is magni¯ed once variable capital utilization is introduced
into a real business cycle model. The predicted fall in utilization in 1995 is 8.1% in the
PF experiment and 8% in the PF one. This is higher than in the data because the model
predicts a greater increase in the capital output ratio than observed.
In summary, including variable capital utilization helps account for some of the variance
of TFP but does not improve the performance of the model during 1995. The model predicts
that utilization and hours should fall by a counterfactually large amount in relative terms
1995, as should, therefore, output.
We also carry out experiments with di®erent values of Á. Recall that this parameter
determines the elasticity of depreciation with respect to utilization. We experimented with
various values for Á, including a value such that the implied steady state depreciation rate
is 5% on a yearly basis. The quantitative results remained practically the same in all cases.
Those results are available upon request.
4.4.2 Labor hoarding
We now give ¯rms another margin of adjustment when confronted with exogenous shocks:
e®ort. A drop in unobservable e®ort in 1995 could explain another part of the fall in unad-
justed TFP. Whether this will help the model's performance in terms of output is unclear, as
in the case of capital utilization. TFP adjusted for both capital utilization and labor hoard-
ing may fall less than unadjusted TFP, but ¯rms now have two additional margins to reduce
output. Nevertheless, introducing labor hoarding should improve the model's predictions for
hours. Since ¯rms can now reduce labor use via e®ort, hours should fall less in 1995.
We model labor hoarding in the spirit of Burnside et al. (1993). Time devoted to
work by household is indivisible: employed households devote time f > 0 to work while
22unemployed households devote no time to work. As in Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988),
we convexify the choice set of households by allowing them to randomize between employment
and unemployment. Speci¯cally, households choose a probability lt of working in a given
period, a level ce
t of consumption when employed, a level cu
t of consumption when unemployed,
and a level ²t of work e®ort when employed. We further assume that working entails a ¯xed





















With this utility function, e®ort is independent of consumption and income, as labor supply
was in the benchmark model. This makes the model with labor hoarding comparable to the
benchmark model in the sense that the wage elasticity of aggregate labor supply is governed
by exogenous parameter º > 1, and, in particular independent of income and consumption.
We assume as Burnside et al. that adjusting labor between periods is costly, although our
speci¯cation of the cost is di®erent from theirs. Without adjustment costs, one easily shows
that the optimal level of e®ort is constant across periods. Burnside et al. assume that it takes
a quarter to adjust employment. Given our modeling of expectations, this constraint would
never bind in our model. We assume instead households who change their work probability
from lt to lt+1 in period t + 1 bear costs
Ãl
2 (lt+1 ¡ lt)2 where Ãl > 0. This speci¯cation
is similar to the one used by Cogley and Nason (1995). As in the case for capital in the
benchmark model, assuming that adjustment costs are borne by households rather than by
¯rms is immaterial but simpli¯es the exposition by keeping the ¯rm's problem static. Letting
wt be the price of labor services, households now face budget constraint:
(ltc
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In Hansen (1985) or Rogerson (1988), it is optimal for agents to equate consumption across
employment states. In our model this is not the case. It remains true that households equate
23utility across employment states at all dates t:
c
e







But this implies that employed households consume more than unemployed households, when
in Hansen (1985) or Rogerson (1988) an household's consumption is independent of their
employment status.













where ²t is the ¯rm's e®ort choice. Variable nt is the fraction of households that the ¯rm
employs. In equilibrium, nt must equal lt in all periods.
We now turn to calculating TFP adjusted for both capital utilization and e®ort. Capital
utilization satis¯es the same condition as in the previous model. But we need an expression











Note that e®ort depends negatively on both the tax on labor and the tax on consumption.
Calibrating º is di±cult since independent evidence on this parameter is not available. We
begin by setting º = 1:5, the value we used for the curvature of the disutility of labor in
the benchmark model. Given the lack of evidence on this parameter, we will make sure via
sensitivity analysis that our results do not critically depend on the value we picked. The
¯xed length of work f is set to 0:45. This number corresponds to average hours per worker
from 1987 to 1994, relative to discretionary time available in a quarter, 1300 hours.











Figure ?? shows that TFP adjusted for e®ort and capital utilization varies very little com-
24pared to unadjusted TFP and TFP adjusted for capital utilization. In other words, e®ort
and utilization together account for a large part of measured movements in TFP. Although
small in absolute terms however, the 1995 fall in adjusted TFP is unusually large relative
to the behavior of the series outside of the crisis. It is, as in the benchmark economy, an
outlier. We also found that when º is raised, e®ort becomes inelastic and the percentage
fall in TFP adjusted for capital utilization and in TFP adjusted for utilization and e®ort
become very similar. TFP movements become smaller if º is close to one.
[Figure 9: Comparing TFP measured with benchmark model, model with capital utiliza-
tion, and model with capital utilization and e®ort]
The key question we want to ask is whether correcting for e®ort helps the model's per-
formance during the crisis. In order to simulate the model in this case, we need to assign
values to a few more parameters. In all experiments we choose · to match the average level
of employment before the crisis. As before, Ãk is chosen to match the volatility of the invest-
ment to GDP ratio before the crisis. The natural way to calibrate the labor adjustment cost
parameter, Ãl, is to try and match the standard deviation of employment before the crisis.
But as a result of the size of the shocks in 1995, we ¯nd that matching this statistics was
not possible. As we explain below, the evolution of labor in this model, like the evolution
of capital, is governed by a second order di®erence equation. Labor does not remain be-
tween reasonable bounds for some parameters. We found that keeping employment swings
reasonable required choosing a value for Ãl that implies counterfactually little variation in
hours before the crisis. Also to keep employment swings within reasonable bounds, we com-
puted the model under optimistic expectations for the interest rate, expectations such that
the model matches the behavior of the capital-output ratio before the crisis. Because labor
adjustment costs are calibrated in this fashion, the predictions of this version of the model
cannot be compared directly to our previous results. We view then as an illustration of the
potential ability of labor hoarding to explain the behavior of output during the crisis.
Computing the model is now more challenging. It requires solving for the stable path of
two simultaneous second order di®erence equations: one for capital and one for labor. To
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t+1))(nt+2 ¡ nt+1) = 0 (4.7)
To obtain a second order di®erence equation for labor that does not involve wt, we need to






Manipulating (??-??) yields the following conditions on the evolution of labor:














¡ (nt+1 ¡ nt)(1 + rt+1(1 ¡ ¿
k
t )) (4.9)
The evolution of capital remains governed by the same second order equation as in the
previous model. Equation (??) enables us to infer a path for e®ort from the evolution of the
output (yt) to hours worked per capita (ntf) ratio, provided values for exogenous parameters
have been chosen. The algorithm we use to compute stable labor and capital path given
exogenous parameters is in appendix B.
The predictions of the model expectations are shown in ¯gure ??. Hours worked become
very smooth, like capital, which is not surprising since their evolution is governed by a similar
second order di®erence equation, and labor adjustment costs are set high. In particular, hours
worked now fall very little in 1995. But e®ort falls markedly once the crisis hits as agents
adjust their expectations. Because hours fall very little, GDP falls much less than before
during the crisis. But over time, as labor slowly adjusts GDP falls markedly below its data
counterpart and eventually diverges from it by magnitudes quite similar to what we obtained
in the benchmark economy. As in the model with capital utilization only, GDP falls a lot
even though adjusted TFP does not because ¯rms make use of a new margin of adjustment:
e®ort. The fall in adjusted TFP, while small in absolute terms, is unusual in relative terms,
and it has a big impact on e®ort as a result. Labor hoarding appears to account for big
chunk of TFP movements during the crisis, but the model continues to overpredict the fall
in output that results from the 1995 TFP shock. We also experimented with various values
26for º. As º falls, e®ort becomes more elastic and the impact of the crisis on TFP becomes
smaller, while the opposite is true when º rises.
5 Conclusion
Some preliminary results are the following. Benchmark model: output, and inputs, fall twice
as much as observed, in percentage terms. The source of this large fall is the collapse of
TFP. Changes in ¯scal policy have a much smaller impact. This result is robust to matching
the path for capital before the crisis. Also, we can ¯nd a value for the elasticity of labor
such that we match the fall in output. But then labor varies much less than in the data.
The main result is robust to using logarithmic preferences, which do not eliminate income
e®ects. The results remain the same in the model with variable capital utilization. The
introduction of labor hoarding reconciles the fall in TFP with the magnitude of the fall in
output. However, the behavior of predicted employment is very di®erent from the observed
one.
A Data for benchmark model
To construct a capital stock series consistent with the model, we use private and public gross
capital formation and purchases of durable goods. We construct a stock series for each kind
of investment, using the perpetual inventory method.21 To construct the stock of private
capital, we assume a yearly depreciation rate of 6%. To construct the stock of government
capital, we assume a depreciation rate of 5%. To construct the stock of durable goods, we
assume a depreciation rate of 20%. To construct total investment, we add up total gross
capital formation and purchases of durable goods. To construct the stock of total capital,
we add up the three previous stocks. The average yearly depreciation rate implied by the
total stock of capital, total investment and the law of motion of capital is 8%, which is of
similar magnitude to the one usually found through calibration of the neoclassical growth
model to the US economy.22 As mentioned previously, we impute the return to government
capital and to the stock of durable goods and add it to measured GDP. We assume a yearly
21Gross capital formation data includes the empirical counterpart of theoretical adjustment costs. We
assume these costs are small and treat all investment as contributing to the capital stock. Mendoza (1991)
reports that the empirical magnitude of adjustment costs in capital for the U.S. is equal to 0.1% of GDP.
Our model predicts in all cases that adjustment costs do not exceed 0.5% of output on average.
22Kydland and Prescott (1982) report a yearly depreciation rate of 10%. Cooley and Prescott (1995)
report a yearly depreciation rate of 5%.
27return of 4%. This is the return of in°ation-indexed U.S. government bonds reported in
McGrattan and Prescott (2000). We also impute depreciation from durable goods and add
it to measured GDP.
B Computational appendix
Benchmark model
Simple manipulations of ¯rst-order conditions for pro¯t maximization show that output
can be reduced to a function of capital, so that equation (??) is a second order di®erence
equation for capital only. We assume that all exogenous variables stay at their 2003Q1 for
ever. Given k0, we look for the unique k1 so that the economy eventually converges to steady
state via a standard shooting algorithm. All endogenous variables can then be calculated as
a function of the path of physical capital. In the perfect foresight experiment, the algorithm
is re-started in the ¯rst quarter of 1995 using as initial value for capital the value agents
would choose under the assumptions that all variables remain at their average pre-crisis level
for ever.
Standard preferences
Given parameter values and paths for exogenous shocks, the algorithm we use consists
of the following steps:
1. Set an initial level
c0







0 , that n0 and k0 are known, and that, from ¯rst order conditions of




2. Get c1 from (4:1).
3. Guess k1 and get y1 and n1 using (4.3) and the de¯nition of output.
4. For t ¸ 0 obtain ct+2 and kt+2 sequentially using (4.1-4.3) and the di®erence equation
on capital
5. Iterate on k1 until path for capital is stable (i.e. variables converge to steady state
values).
Having obtained a path for all endogenous variables save assets, we simply ¯nd the unique
a0 so that the asset path implied by the household's budget constraint is stable.
Capital utilization
Utilization is a function of the capital-output ratio. Therefore, (??) can be written as a
second order di®erence equation for capital only as in the benchmark model, and the same
shooting algorithm can be used.
Labor hoarding
28The algorithm we use in the Labor hoarding is as follows, given initial values (k0;n0) for
capital and labor set to their data counterparts:
1. Guess a full path fn
guess
t gT
t=0, where T is a large number, for employment.
2. Choose k1 so that, given the labor guess, the path predicted by the second order
di®erence equation for capital is stable.
3. Find n1 so that given the path for capital obtained in step 2, the path for labor
predicted by (??) is stable.
4. Iterate until the paths for labor and capital are approximately invariant
In the perfect foresight experiment, the algorithm is re-started in the ¯rst quarter of 1995
using as initial value for capital and employment the values agents would choose under the
assumptions that all variables remain at their average pre-crisis level for ever.
29Bibliography
Atkeson, A. and P. J. Kehoe (1999), "Models of Energy Use: Putty-Putty vs. Putty-
Clay", American Economic Review, September 1999.
Banco de Mexico (1996), Informe Anual 1995, Mexico D.F.: Banco de Mexico.
Bergoeing, R., P. J. Kehoe, T. J. Kehoe and R. Soto (2002), \Decades Lost and Found:
Mexico and Chile Since 1980", Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Vol.
26, pp. 3-30.
Burnside C. and M. Eichenbaum (1996),\Factor Hoarding and the Propagation of Business-
Cycle Shocks", American Economic Review, Vol. 86, pp. 1154-1174.
Burnside, C., M. Eichenbaum and S. Rebelo (1993), \Labor Hoarding and the Business
Cycle", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 101, pp. 245-273.
Burnside, C., M. Eichenbaum and S. Rebelo (2001), \Hedging and Financial Fragility in
Fixed Exchange Rate Regimes", European Economic Review 45, pp. 1151-1193.
Burstein, A., M. Eichenbaum and S. Rebelo, \Why Is In°ation So Low After Large
Devaluations?", NBER Working Paper No. 8748, January 2002.
Calvo, G.A., \Balance of Payments Crises in Emerging Markets: Large Capital In°ows
and Sovereign Governments", in Paul Krugman (editor) Currency Crises, Chicago, Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 2000.
Cavallo, M., K. Kisselev, F. Perri and N. Roubini, \Exchange rate overshooting and the
costs of °oating", New York University, April (2004).
Chari, V.V., P.J. Kehoe and E.R. McGrattan (2003), \Accounting for the Great Depres-
sion", Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 27 pp. 2-8.
Chari, V.V., P.J. Kehoe and E.R. McGrattan, \Business Cycle Accounting", revised,
Sta® Report 328, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, October
2004.
Cogley, T. and J. M. Nason (1995), \Output Dynamics in Real-Business-Cycle Models",
American Economic Review, Vol. 85, pp. 492-511.
Cole, H.L. and T.J. Kehoe, \A self-ful¯lling model of Mexico's 1994-1995 debt crisis",
Journal of International Economics 41 (1996), pp. 309-330.
Cook, D. and M. B. Devereux (2004), \Accounting for the East Asian Crisis: A Quanti-
tative Model of Capital Out°ows in Small Open Economies", working paper, University of
British Columbia. Forthcoming, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
Cooley, T. F. and E. C. Prescott (1995), \Economic Growth and Business Cycles", Chap-
ter 1 in T. F. Cooley, editor, Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, pp. 1-38.
Correia, I., J. C. Neves and S. Rebelo (1995), \Business Cycles in a Small Open Econ-
omy", European Economic Review, Vol. 39, pp. 1089-1113.
Corsetti, G, P. Pesenti and N. Roubini, \Paper Tigers? A Model of the Asian Crisis",
European Economic Review 43 (1999), pp. 1211-1236.
Dotsey, M. and C.S. Mao (1992), \How well do linear approximation methods work?",
Journal of Monetary Economics 29 (1992), pp. 25-58.
Fernandez, A. M. and I. Trigueros (2001), \Analisis, Evaluacion y Propuestas para una
Reforma Tributaria", Gaceta de Economia, Suplemento, pp. 69-144.
Gertler, M. S. Gilchrist and F. Natalucci (2003), \External Financial Constraints on
Monetary Policy and the Financial Accelerator", NBER Working Paper 10128.
30Gollin, D., \Getting Income Shares Right", Journal of Political Economy, Volume 110,
Number 2, April 2002, pp. 458-474.
Greenwood,J., Z. Hercowitz and G. W. Hu®man (1988), \Investment, Capacity Utiliza-
tion and the Real Business Cycle", American Economic Review, Vol. 78, pp. 402-417.
Hansen, G. D. (1985), \Indivisible Labor and the Business Cycle", Journal of Monetary
Economics, Vol. 16, pp. 309-327.
IMF (2004),\International Financial Statistics", CD Dataset.
Kehoe, T.J. and E.C. Prescott (2002)\Great Depressions of the 20th Century ", Review
of Economic Dynamics 5, pp. 1-18.
Kydland, F. E. and E. C. Prescott (1982), \Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations",
Econometrica, Vol. 50, pp. 1345-1371.
Lahiri, Amartya, and C.A. Vegh, \Output Costs, BOP Crises, and Optimal Interest Rate
Policy", University of California at Los Angeles, June 2002.
Lane, P.R. and G.M. Milesi-Ferretti (2001),\The external wealth of nations: measures of
foreign assets and liabilities for industrial and developing countries", Journal of International
Economics 55, pp. 263-294.
McGrattan, E. R. and E. C. Prescott (2000), \Is the Stock Market Overvalued", Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Vol. 24, pp. 20-40.
Mendoza, E. G. (1991), \Real Business Cycles in a Small Open Economy", American
Economic Review, Vol. 81, pp. 797-818.
Mendoza, E. G. (2002), \Credit, Prices, and Crashes: Business Cycles with a Sudden
Stop", in S. Edwards and J. Frankel, editors, Preventing Currency Crises in Emerging Mar-
kets, NBER.
Mendoza, E. G., A. Razin and L. Tesar (1994), \E®ective Tax Rates in Macroeconomics:
Cross-country Estimates of Tax Rates on Factor Incomes and Consumption", Journal of
Monetary Economics, Vol. 34, pp. 297-323.
Neumeyer, P. A. and F. Perri (2001), \Business Cycles in Emerging Economies: The
Role of Interest Rates", working paper, New York University.
Rogerson, R. (1988), \Indivisible Labor, Lotteries and Equilibrium", Journal of Monetary
Economics, Vol. 21, pp. 3-16.
31List of figures:
1. Data on:
GDP per capita detrended
Capital per capita detrended
Hours worked per capita
TFP





Benchmark total factor productivity
Quarterly interest rates
Price of energy
Taxes on consumption and capital and labor income
3. Benchmark model results
4. Benchmark model, optimistic expectations
5. Benchmark model, low elasticity of labor supply
6. Model with log preferences
7. Model with utilization

































































































































































































































































































































Price of energy, 1994.4=1






















Capital to output ratio








































Capital to output ratio


































Capital to output ratio







































Capital to output ratio
Data
PS






















Capital to output ratio





























Total Factor Productivities, 1994.4=1
Benchmark
Utilization















Capital to output ratio
Data
Optimistic PS


























1990 1995 2000 2005
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
Effort
Data
Optimistic PS